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Debate: Public audit, the Redmond review, and the use of public interest
reports
Pete Murphy and Katarzyna Lakoma
Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, UK
Public audit arrangements for local authorities in
England are currently being subjected to a widescale
independent review led by Sir Tony Redmond—a
past president of CIPFA. This follows a series of recent
government reviews into audit from Sir Kingman
(2018) on the Financial Reporting Council, the
Competition and Markets Authority’s (2019) study of
the statutory audit market and Sir Brydon (2019) on
the quality and effectiveness of audit. It also reflects
growing concerns about the arrangements for public
audit, the implementation of the Local Audit and
Accountability Act 2014 and the public assurance
regime for local authorities in general (Murphy et al.,
2019). Last year the NAO reported that ‘qualified
conclusions on arrangements to secure value for
money locally are both unacceptably high and
increasing. The proportion of local public bodies
whose plans for keeping spending within budget are
not fit-for-purpose, or who have significant
weaknesses in their governance, is too high’ (NAO,
2019, p. 8).
Appointed in July 2019, the Redmond review
published a consultation document in September 2019
containing 43 questions, including specific questions
about the use of public interest reports (PIRs). Since this
consultation closed, the awareness of PIRs has spiked as
a result of the publication of the first report to a
principal council since the 2014 Act was implemented
and the failure, despite repeated indications to the
contrary, of another auditor to issue a PIR.
PIRs provide auditors with the power to report
publicly on any matter that adversely influences a
council’s finances that may be of interest to the
authority or to the general public. PIRs are part of the
arrangements for value-for-money reporting and can
be made at any time and must be copied to the
secretary of state for local government. There are
equivalents reports in Scotland and Wales, and New
Zealand has provision for ‘other matter’ paragraphs in
its annual audits under the Public Audit Act 2001.
Among other things, these can review contract
practices for probity, sensitive spending, or
governance Issues.
A PIR was issued to Nottingham City Council in
August 2020 under section 24, schedule 7 of the
2014 Act (Grant Thornton, 2020). It related to the
governance and financial affairs of their Robin Hood
Energy company established by the council in 2015.
There has been a small but regular number of reports
on town and parish councils and parish meetings
since the Act was implemented, but all previous
principal council reports have issued under section 8
of the Audit Commission Act 1998 or earlier legislation.
PIRs were numerous and high profile in England
prior to the implementation of corporate inspections
and interventions. In 1985 there were 54 and, in
1986, there were 89—with later high-profile reports
in the London boroughs of Westminster (1988) and
Hammersmith & Fulham (1989). There was another
spate of reports around the time Best Value and
Comprehensive Performance Assessments were
introduced in 2002, but Redmond noted that PIRs
‘seem to no longer be used’ which ‘is surprising given
the increasingly high profile of commercial and other
new arrangements entered into by some local
authorities’ (Redmond, 2019, p. 29). The latter is, of
course, one of the issues with Nottingham City
Council and it has also been part of a long-running
saga at Northamptonshire County Council. In their
fifth report to the secretary of state for local
government in March 2020, Northamptonshire
County Council stated:
After a lengthy period of deliberation, the Council’s
previous auditors have decided not to issue a Public
Interest Report into the events leading up to the
financial collapse of the organisation. We are
disappointed by this decision. For the first local
authority in a generation to effectively declare itself
insolvent not to be the subject of such a report is
certainly surprising given the subject matter of previous
Public Interest Report…we believe there is a lot to
learn from Northamptonshire (McArdle & Roberts,
2020, p. 2.)
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The response from Nottingham City Council was
immediate and comprehensive, with the leader of the
council issuing a public apology and announcing that
the council would accept and expedite the
implementation of all 13 recommendations of the
auditors. They have since announced the closure of
the company and the sale of the company’s customer
book to British Gas.
So, if PIRs are so effective why are there so few? In
their response to Redmond, the PSSA commented
that auditors ‘are leaning more towards making
statutory recommendations as they perceive that
they are quicker to process and receive appropriate
publicity’ although ‘statutory recommendations are
also used relatively infrequently’ (PSAA, 2019, p. 31).
ICAEW thought ‘local public auditors and
management believe that auditors’ other powers,
such as statutory recommendations, are more
effective tools in raising and alerting stakeholders
about issues of concern’ (ICAEW, 2019, p. 28).
This was not the case in Northamptonshire County
Council where the Best Value report (Caller, 2018)
reveals that recommendations were featured in the
2016/17 and 2017/18 audit reports to no avail.
In Nottingham, the auditors having previously
expressed concerns to senior officers and the audit
committee, decided in October 2019 that it was
appropriate for them to make formal
recommendations to the council to draw attention to
the level of risk faced and encourage it to take
further action to manage those risks: ‘We determined,
however, that it was not in the public interest at that
time for such consideration to be made public, and
we therefore agreed with the council that it would
treat our recommendations as if they were statutory
recommendations with the exception of meeting the
publicity requirements’. The auditors wrote to the
council in December 2019 who considered it a
private meeting of the council executive. However,
the auditors did not receive a formal response. This
also left the most important stakeholders—the
council taxpayers and the customers of Robin Hood
Energy—in ignorance about the security of their
energy supply. It took the PIR to get any information
and instant action.
In our view, PIRs and statutory recommendations are
both useful parts of the public assurance and financial
investigation portfolio, as are statutory interventions
based on part 3 of the Local Government Act 1999
(Best Value inspections). There are circumstances
where either or both can be effective, but neither are
sufficient to cover all relevant circumstances. The
NAO have given a great deal more prominence to
both in their latest Code of Audit Practice (NAO,
2020) but, given past experience and the proliferation
of commercial involvements and hybridized
governance arrangements involving local authorities,
we think they need revitalizing and a more
fundamental review. We hope Sir Tony Redmond
agrees.
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